TAXONOMIES OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING: AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE
Ralph Wilde*
The taxonomies of "peacekeeping" utilized within academic and policy
discourse provide a framework for comparison across (usually United Nations
-conducted) peace operations. One point of distinction often made between
different operations is the level of complexity.' Whether operations are "basic"
or "complex," "simple" or "multifunctional" is usually determined according
to size, scope of mandate, and the presence or absence of a civilian component
in addition to a military component. Many commentators adopt "generational"
language to denote these different levels of complexity. In this short article, I
consider the particular narrative device of peacekeeping "generations" in the
light of the long history of one particular type of international peace operation:
granting administrative prerogatives over territory to international organizations,
what I term "international territorial administration."2 I argue that the
generational taxonomy is unhelpful in its own terms, and problematic on a
normative level.
The dichotomy between simple and complex peace operations is often
described in terms of old versus new3 or first generation versus second
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generation, 4 suggesting that changes in the complexity of peace missions have
occurred in a linear fashion, with missions becoming progressively more
complex. Such a suggestion is no accident. For many commentators, there was
a sea change in the nature of peacekeeping from the late 1980s onwards; a
"turning point," in the words of Jarat Chopra.5 With the backdrop of the
supposed post-cold war internationalist revival, and the emergence of "new"
types of conflict that were both international and internal in character, there was
a dramatic growth in complex United Nations peace operations starting with
UNTAG in Namibia in 1989.6 Accordingly, there was a paradigm shift from7
"first generation" to "second generation," from "old" to "new" peacekeeping.
With the Kosovo and East Timor administration projects-Kosovo has been
administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) since 1999, and East Timor was administered by the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from the end of 1999
until May 2002-it has been suggested that complexity has reached such a level
that we can now talk about a further "generation" of peacekeeping. Christine
Gray remarks that these two projects could be described as "third generation"
peacekeeping.8 Boris Kondoch, citing W. Kuhn, considers "peace enforcement"
missions such as UNOSOM II in Somalia "third generation" peacekeeping and
UNTAET and UNMIK, because of their complexity, examples of "fourth
generation" peacekeeping. 9 Thus, the language of "generations" and the
4.
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"old/new" dichotomy presents the history of international peace operations as
a progressive evolution through successive generations of ever-increasing
complexity. How does this presentation stand up to scrutiny?
In the first place, the history of international territorial administration
suggests that describing the relative complexity of peace operations so as to
denote a progressive increase in complexity over time as between individual
missions is in its own terms mistaken. Elsewhere, I have described this history
in the following terms:
International organizations first exercised territorial
administration in the Free City of Danzig, where the League of
Nations enjoyed certain governmental prerogatives from 1920 to
1939. In addition, the League administered the German Saar Basin
(the Saar) between 1920 and 1935, and the Colombian town and
district of Leticia (Leticia) from 1933 to 1934. It also appointed the
president of the Upper Silesia Mixed Commission in 1922 and the
chair of the Memel Harbor board in Lithuania in 1924. Immediately
after the Second World War, Germany and Austria were administered
by the Allies. With the creation of the United Nations, the new
international organization was authorized in 1947 to exercise certain
governmental powers in what would have become the Free Territory
of Trieste, but the free territory plan was never realized.
The United Nations first exercised territorial administration in
the 1960s, asserting various administrative prerogatives in the Congo
between 1960 and 1964, and administering West Irian for seven
months between 1962 and 1963. In 1967, the United Nations Council
for what was then South West Africa (later Namibia) was established
to administer the territory, but South Africa prevented the council
from taking up this role. Over twenty years later, in 1991 the United
Nations was authorized to perform administrative functions in
Western Sahara and Cambodia; although these functions were
exercised in Cambodia from 1991 to 1992, they are yet to be fully
performed in Western Sahara. From 1994 to 1996, a different
institution-the EUAM [the European Union Administration in
Mostar]-administered the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Then, as part of the Dayton process, the territory of Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Eastern Slavonia) in Croatia was
placed under UN administration from 1996 to 1998. In some of the
aforementioned missions, and in others as well, the mandates of
international organizations have called for the performance of two
particular administrative functions: controlling or conducting some
form of territory-wide popular consultation and/or 'community
of "second generation" peacekeeping, rather than a separate "generation" of the peacekeeping paradigm. See,
e.g., UN Peacekeeping: An Early Reckoning of the Second Generation, supra note 4.
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building' through the creation of local institutions. In addition to the
authorized projects, other ITA projects were proposed but never
agreed upon for Fiume in Dalmatia (in 1919), Memel (between 1921
and 1923), Alexandretta in Syria (in 1937), Jerusalem (since 1947)
and Sarajevo (in 1994).0

In addition to the plenary administration project in Kosovo, another
mission, involving partial administration by the Office of the High
Representative, has taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the start of
1996."
Whether one is focusing on plenary administration or partial
administration, international organizations generally or the United Nations in
particular, the above history suggests that the complex international peace
operations from 1988 onwards are, in terms of their complexity, nothing new.
The first complex peace operations involving plenary international territorial
administration were the Saar in 1920 (in the League era) and West Irian in 1962
- 63 (in the United Nations era). 2 The first such missions involving partial
administration were Danzig in 1920 (in the League era) and the Congo in 1960
- 64 (in the United Nations era).' 3 Insofar as the Kosovo and East Timor
missions involve plenary administration exercised by the United Nations, they
are not unprecedented but follow on from the West Irian and Eastern Slavonia
missions. If the focus is broadened to international organizations generally, the
precedents run back even further to the start of the League of Nations in 1920.
Some of the "generational" commentators focus on the "state building"
aspect of "post conflict" peace operations. Exercising territorial prerogatives
is one thing, but the use of such prerogatives with a "nation building" purpose
is a relatively new phenomenon. As far as the "nation building" purpose is
concerned, the United Nations mission in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s is
widely regarded as the first United Nations operation to engage in "peace
enforcement."' 4 The equally pioneering "nation building" administrative
activities of that same mission, exercising administration to enable the operation
of certain government institutions, are rarely acknowledged. 5 Yet once the full
scope of ONUC's operation is borne in mind, it becomes just as difficult to see
a clear distinction between post-and pre-1998 operations on "state building"
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grounds as it is on "enforcement" grounds. 6 Certainly, the next operations of
these types did not take place until the post-1998 era (Namibia in 1989 for "state
building" and UNOSOM II in 1991 for "peace enforcement"). The point is that
the enterprise that lay behind these later operations was not unprecedented.
"Nation building" is not, then, an exclusively post-1998 phenomenon. But
a qualitative distinction can perhaps be made between UNMIK and UNTAET,
on the one hand, and the "nation building" missions that came before them, on
the other. Arguably, the degree to which these two missions have engaged in
the reconstruction of infrastructure and governmental institutions is
unprecedented at least if one discounts the Allied administration in Germany
after the Second World War.'7 A question remains, however, whether the scope
of a "state building" mandate should be the primary indicator, in addition to the
breadth of the administrative prerogatives exercised, by which complexity and
distinctiveness are measured. For example, what of plenary administration
concerned with territorial disposition? Is the United Nations administration in
Eastern Slavonia, from 1996-98, which necessitated the eventual transfer of a
population to authorities from whom local militias had hitherto sought
independence, necessarily less complex than the two and a half-year East Timor
mission, where, infrastructural problems notwithstanding, the eventual outcome
for the territory was overwhelmingly supported? 8 Similarly, what of
administration missions aimed at facilitating a particularly controversial policy?
Stepping back to the League-era, can it really be said that the three-year long
mission in East Timor is more complex than the fifteen-year mission in the
Saar? The League was involved in administering a territory bitterly contested
between France and Germany, enabling a key component of Germany's muchresented reparations program to proceed, before organizing what was in effect
a self-determination referendum and then implementing the result of that
referendum. '9
To be fair, neither Agenda for Peace, nor Agenda for Peace Supplement,2"
nor the Brahimi Report seem particularly interested in a progressivist
presentation of the complexity of international peace operations, even though,
16.

Like "state building," "peace enforcement" is often presented as a "new" phenomenon through

the use of generational language, whether second or third.
17.

Wilde, supra note 2, at 592 text accompanying n. 47. See also RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE,

supra note 3 at xx (remarking that "[tihe most extensive peace-building effort in history took place in Europe
and Asia in the post-World War H era when the US and its allies assisted nations in those continents

devastated by a decade of war").
18.
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by virtue of their remit, they are able to discount the League-era projects that so
obviously undermine such a presentation. In Agenda for Peace, the terms
"new" and "second-generation peacekeeping are conspicuous by their absence. 2'
Only one, passing reference (in a table) is made to "classical" and
"multifunctional" peacekeeping in Agenda for Peace Supplement.22 Similarly,
Brahimi makes the odd reference to "newer generations" of peacekeeping
without defining this term or drawing any conclusions from its use.23
Nonetheless, the language of "generations" has come to play a central role in
academic discourse on peace operations since the early 1990s. So we have, on
the one hand, a set of historical circumstances placing into question the notion
that complex international peace operations are an exclusively late twentieth
century phenomenon and, on the other hand, an established academic discourse
predicated on this notion.
One of the few scholars writing in the "new" era to acknowledge the longstanding existence of complex international peace operations is Steven Ratner
in The New UN Peacekeeping.24 However, as his title suggests, Ratner
nonetheless adopts the language of "generations" and the "new/old" dichotomy
in his study of such operations, perhaps because of the widespread currency
such an approach now enjoys. One quarter of his book concerns operations, the
League projects and ONUC, for example, that take place before the "new" era,
in some cases seventy years before.25 Ratner must describe these projects as
examples of the "new peacekeeping," and in an effort to accommodate the
obvious problem this raises with the new/old dichotomy, the presence of these
projects in the "old" era is explained in terms of "earlier efforts" at the "new"
paradigm. 26 For example, the League administration in the Saar is "second
generation peacekeeping before its time."27 When there are so many earlier
efforts, stretching back over such a long period, of a supposedly "new"
phenomenon, one should surely ask whether or not the dichotomies of new/old
and first generation/second generation are helpful. Why insist that 1989 is the
"time" of complex peace operations, and not also 1919?

21.
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Clearly some peace operations are more complex than others. Moreover,
some projects have a "state building" purpose; others do not. The point is that
the complexity of peace operations has waxed and waned since the start of the
League. Similarly, the involvement of such operations in "nation building" has
been present since at least the 1960s and much earlier if one includes the Allies
in post-war Germany and Austria. The "time" of complexity and civilian
involvement in international peace operations has been the entire twentieth
century. To be sure, with the administration projects in Cambodia, Mostar,
Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and United
Nations -run refugee camps,2" and the other complex peace missions without an
administration component, the final decade of that century witnessed a marked
upsurge in the use of peace operations that are both complex and engaged in a
"nation building" enterprise. However, an upsurge in and intensification of an
activity with a long-standing pedigree (with the possible exception of the
ambitious scope of state building in Kosovo and East Timor) is not the same as
the emergence of a "new" type of peace operation. The year 1988, then, marks
a particular moment of renewal, not a qualitative (rather than quantitative)
"turning point." Also, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the increase in peace
operatiohs since 1988 has covered both "complex" and relatively
straightforward operations. Just as the "old" era contains several important
examples of the "new peacekeeping," so the "new" era is replete with "old"
style peacekeeping operations.29
Adopting a progressivist narrative to denote changes in complexity may in
any case be problematic because of the way it can serve as a legitimizing device.
As "third" or "fourth" generation missions, the projects in East Timor and
Kosovo are positioned as the culmination of a historical process. They represent
progress in the development of peace operations from the "old" or "traditional"
days. Not only does relative complexity mean "newness," then, suggesting a
break from the past. The language of generations, with its evolutionary
connotations of progressive improvement, has a normative import. By ascribing
differences in complexity through the use of this language, therefore, peace
operations are classified normatively simply according to the changes in their
complexity. Thus, UNMIK and UNTAET merely by virtue of their
comparatively complex nature are presented in terms that suggest relative
legitimacy.

28.
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Of course, the adoption of relative complexity as the benchmark of
legitimacy seems absurd. The point is not that scholars who use the language
of "generations" necessarily wish to make such a suggestion, but rather that the
language used has this effect. Indeed, some commentators do seem to suggest
that increased complexity is somehow inherently superior. John Sanderson, for
example, although not using the generational language, focuses exclusively on
the degree of powers exercised by the East Timor mission and proclaims this to
be a "step forward of millenial proportions" in United Nations peace operations
with the mission being of a "high-quality." 3 Furthermore, the progressivist
nature of the "generations" language rationalizes international territorial
administration, by constructing a chain of reasoning that presents this activity
as the logical conclusion.
The language of "generations" and "old" versus "new" peace operations
(or peacekeeping) should perhaps be substituted with a taxonomy that does not
connote a linear process of historical evolution, for example "basic" versus
"complex" or "multifunctional." Otherwise, we risk misunderstanding the
history of international peace operations, and ascribing normative value to
certain operations on spurious grounds.
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